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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Arbitration Act1 and the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards2
guarantee the enforceability of domestic and international arbitration agreements.3 As federal law, these guarantees presumably preempt any attempt by a state to prohibit arbitration
agreements in insurance contracts.4 However, Congress complicated preemption questions involving the state regulation of
insurance by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,5 which
shelters states’ regulatory schemes from implied preemption by
“Acts of Congress.”6 Although courts generally agree that
McCarran-Ferguson shields state prohibitions of arbitration
agreements in insurance contracts from preemption by the
Federal Arbitration Act’s guarantee of enforcement of domestic
arbitration agreements, they disagree as to whether McCarranFerguson similarly protects state law from the New York Convention’s guarantee of the enforceability of international arbitration agreements.
This Article argues that the self-execution framework that
courts have adopted—and scholars have endorsed—in addressing whether McCarran-Ferguson enables states to reverse
preempt the New York Convention is inadequate.7 First, the

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter New York Convention].
3 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act provides a substantive
rule that arbitration agreements are generally valid); see also 9 U.S.C. § 201
(2006) (applying this guarantee to agreements arising under the New York
Convention).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that federal law is the supreme
law of the land).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).
6 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003). For a more in
depth discussion of McCarran–Ferguson, see infra Part II and II.B.
7 See, e.g., Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, The Remaining Hostility
Towards Arbitration Shielded by the McCarran–Ferguson Act: How Far
Should the Protection to Policyholders Go?, 1 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 35, 601
2
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Article addresses the interpretive question: what is an “Act of
Congress” under McCarran-Ferguson? By examining whether a
treaty is self or non-self-executing, courts discard proper methods of statutory interpretation. Second, the Article argues that
courts have failed to satisfactorily transpose the self-execution
doctrine—which has been relevant only in determining whether a treaty confers a legally enforceable right in the U.S.—into
the context of the conflict between McCarran-Ferguson and the
New York Convention. Finally, the Article argues that the
treaty’s self-executing or non-self-executing status is irrelevant
because enforcing an international arbitration agreement under the New York Convention implicates Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act—which implemented the Convention—and
McCarran-Ferguson permits a state law to reverse preempt an
Act of Congress. Since the self-execution approach fails to answer the interpretive problem posed by McCarran-Ferguson,
practitioners and courts should adopt an alternative approach
that is more consistent with proper methods of statutory interpretation.
Part II of this Article sets up the framework in which the
previously mentioned legal question arises. It reviews federal
law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements, including the Federal Arbitration Act, the New York Convention,
and McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption scheme as it relates to federal arbitration law. Part III introduces the disagreement between federal courts as to whether McCarranFerguson permits states to reverse preempt the implementa-

61 (2010); Timothy B. Parlin, Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance
Contracts Trump State Law Restrictions, 199 N.J.L.J. 578, 578 (2010) (both
endorsing the self-executing framework). “Reverse preemption” or “inverse
preemption” means that a state law is not “invalidate[d], impair[ed], or supersede[d],” by a federal law. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in
Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11
CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 272 n.72 (2005) (using both terms to refer to the effect of
Section 2(b) of McCarran–Ferguson); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (stating: “No
act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance.”). These terms are somewhat misleading
because for a state law to “inverse preempt” or “reverse preempt” a federal
law under McCarran–Ferguson, the two laws do not need to conflict. See infra Part II.B (explaining that that McCarran–Ferguson is primarily a rule of
construction).
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tion of the New York Convention to the extent that it may be
applied to the business of insurance. Part IV argues that the
methodology of resolving this disagreement—which currently
centers on whether or not the New York Convention is a selfexecuting treaty—inadequately addresses Congress’s purpose
in enacting McCarran-Ferguson. It further contends that regardless of the self-executing or non-self-executing status of the
New York Convention, McCarran-Ferguson protects state law
from preemption by the substantive guarantees of the New
York Convention because an Act of Congress, Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, provides the sole mechanism for the
enforcement and recognition of international arbitration
agreements under the Convention. Part V briefly concludes
this Article.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON: IS
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AN “ACT OF CONGRESS”?
McCarran-Ferguson provides that “[n]o Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”8 Although there is little doubt that legislation passed by Congress usually constitutes an “Act of Congress,” courts have disagreed about whether a treaty that has
been implemented by domestic legislation is also an “Act of
Congress.”
A. Law Governing Arbitration Agreements in the United
States
Many states were initially hostile to agreements to submit
private disputes to arbitration.9 State courts were hostile be-

8 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, § 2(b) (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2009)).
9 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008); LON L.
FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 433 (3d ed. 1972).
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cause they were disfavored at common law.10 When judges
were paid per case they handled, they had financial incentives
to expand, rather than minimize, their jurisdiction and increase the number of cases on their dockets.11 This hostility
toward arbitration continued at common law in the United
States because judges continued to be skeptical of arbitration
agreements that “ousted courts of their jurisdiction” to hear
disputes.12 The opposition also stemmed from concerns “that
arbitrators were ill-equipped ‘to administer justice’”13 and that
arbitrators’ decisions were unreviewable.14
1. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress ended most states’ hostility toward arbitration by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, which provided
for the general validity of arbitration agreements.15 Under section 2 of Chapter 1, an arbitration agreement is valid if two
conditions are met.16 First, the arbitration agreement must be
included in a written contract involving interstate commerce or
implicating maritime law.17 Second, the arbitration clause
must not be revocable for reasons that exist at law or equity.18
Such grounds for revocation include subject-neutral19 contractual defenses that demonstrate the invalidity of a contract at

10 Patrick M. Birney, Reawakening Section 1334: Resolving the Conflict
Between Bankruptcy and Arbitration Through Abstention Analysis, 16 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 619, 626–27 (2008).
11 ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 64 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining:
“[s]omewhat more cynically, one might also suppose that it originated in considerations of competition for business, at a time when judge’s salaries still
depended on fees paid by litigants.”).
12 FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 9, at 432–34.
13 Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Teminix Cos. v. Dobsons Exterminated Alabama’s Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 580 (1996).
14 See Rogers v. Dep’t of Def. Dependents Sch., 814 F.2d 1549, 1553–54
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that arbitrators’ decisions are “virtually unreviewable on appeal”).
15 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
16 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984).
17 Id. at 11.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 16 (explaining that “[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements”).
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the outset the agreement20 such as mutual mistake, fraud, duress,21 and unconscionability.22
By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress established a federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.23 This policy was supported by the oft-cited benefits of arbitration. Arbitration can be a quicker and cheaper alternative to litigation because it reduces courts’ case loads.24 It
can also encourage parties to settle their disputes more cooperatively by removing the dispute to a relatively informal, confidential setting.25 Arbitration can even provide parties with increased flexibility by permitting them to choose arbitrators who
have “expert knowledge of the subject matter in dispute.”26
At the time Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act,
it was generally understood that the Act established procedures by which federal courts would enforce arbitration agreements.27 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,28 however, the Supreme Court held that
Section 2 created a federal substantive right29 rooted in Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.30 Section 2 thereby
preempted most state laws that prohibited the enforcement of
such agreements by guaranteeing the substantive right in state
courts.31 The Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital effec-

20 See County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53, 56
(1971).
21 Id.
22 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 189–220 (2004).
23 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983).
24 RAU ET AL., supra note 11, at 4.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id.
27 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
28 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10, 16.
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tively ended any residual state hostility toward arbitration.32
2. The New York Convention
In 1958, forty-five countries convened in New York to negotiate and draft a treaty to promote the international enforcement and recognition of international arbitration agreements and foreign arbitral awards.33 The conference was called
in response to the increasing popularity and success of international arbitration.34 Although the United States was present at
the conference, its role in the drafting and negotiating the treaty was limited.35 The United States hesitated to involve itself
in the negotiations due to its concerns that an arbitration treaty would conflict with domestic law.36 At the close of the conference, the United States withheld its signature from the
Convention.37
Over the next decade, the United States began to
acknowledge the benefits of joining the New York Convention.38
In 1968, Under Secretary Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach
sent to President Lyndon B. Johnson a Letter of Transmittal
recommending the President’s submission of the New York
Convention to Congress for its advice and consent.39 Under
Secretary Katzenbach urged President Johnson to recommend
that Congress pass domestic legislation to conform U.S. law to
the Convention’s requirements.40 Taking his advice, President

32 See

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974).
Letter from Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Under Sec’y, to Lyndon
B. Johnson, President (Apr. 13, 1968), in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 5–7 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n
ed., 1971) [hereinafter Katzenbach Letter].
34 See id.
35 James van R. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in NEW STRATEGIES FOR
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 25–26 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n ed., 1971).
36 John P. McMahon, Implementation of the UN Convention on Foreign
Arbitral Awards in the U.S., in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 75, 77 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n ed.,
1971).
37 Id.
38 Katzenbach Letter, supra note 33, at 5-6.
39 Id.
40 Id.
33
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Johnson submitted the treaty to Congress for its advice and
consent, insisting that Congress resolve any conflicts between
the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention.41
Congress unanimously approved the Convention42 and subsequently amended the Federal Arbitration Act to implement the
New York Convention.43
The United States committed to recognizing and enforcing
international arbitration agreements when it finally acceded to
the New York Convention in 1970.44 Article II of the New York
Convention provides for the enforcement of international arbitration agreements.45 It states, “Contracting State[s] shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may rise between them . . . concerning a subject matter capable of arbitration.”46 It clarifies that an
“agreement in writing” includes an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate arbitration agreement that is either signed
by the parties or is “contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”47 It further directs a court of a Contracting State to refer a matter to arbitration upon a party’s showing of a written
arbitration agreement unless the court finds the agreement to
be “null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”48 Article V provides that the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the award is made
pursuant to an Article II “agreement [that] is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or . . . under the

114 CONG. REC. 10,488 (1968).
CONG. REC. 29,605 (1968).
43 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970).
44 See Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization, Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural
Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 362 n.16 (2008) (explaining that the United
States ratified the Convention in 1970).
45 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
46 Id. art. II(1).
47 Id. art II(2).
48 Id. art. II(3).
41

42 114
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law of the country in which the award was made.”49
As per President Johnson’s insistence, Congress added a
second chapter to the Federal Arbitration Act to implement the
Convention.50 The first section of Chapter 2 provides that the
“[New York] Convention shall be enforced in United States
courts in accordance with this chapter.”51 The second section
stipulates which agreements shall be deemed to fall under the
Convention. In particular, it deems all arbitration agreements
arising out of legal commercial relationships to “fall[] under the
Convention” unless the agreement is entirely between U.S. citizens or businesses that are either incorporated or have their
principal place of business in the United States and their legal
relationship has no “reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”52 The third section deems “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention [to] arise under the laws and
treaties of the United States” and provides U.S. district courts
with original jurisdiction “over such an action or proceeding.”53
Other sections provide broad rules for venue and removal
of an action or proceeding falling under the Convention.54
Chapter 2 also grants a district court that has jurisdiction under its provisions the power to compel arbitration and appoint
arbitrators in accordance with an agreement.55 It requires a
district court to confirm an arbitration award that a party
seeks to confirm unless the party seeks the confirmation more
than three years after winning the award or if the recognition
or enforcement of the award may be refused on grounds specified in the Convention.56 Chapter 2’s concluding section provides that Chapter 1 applies to arbitration agreements falling
under the Convention to the extent that Chapter 1 does not
conflict with Chapter 2 or the Convention.57
The United States has several foreign policy interests at
stake in the consistent enforcement of international arbitration
Id. art. V.
9 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 204, 205 (2006).
55 Id. at § 106.
56 Id. § 207.
57 Id. § 208.
49
50
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agreements. First, refusals to enforce valid international arbitration agreements may undermine the United States’s position as a “trusted trading partner in multilateral endeavors.”58
Second, consistent enforcement of agreements in U.S. courts,
“even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in
a domestic context,” ensures the predictable enforcement of international arbitration agreements.59 Finally, because the
Convention promotes reciprocity among signatories that enforce the Convention, failures to enforce international arbitration agreements might decrease domestic companies’ access to
foreign markets by encouraging “unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying . . . to secure tactical litigation advantages.”60 These foreign policy interests have led the Supreme Court of the United States to announce an especially
strong policy favoring the validity of international agreements
to arbitrate.61
B. Reverse Preemption Under McCarran-Ferguson
The states traditionally have regulated domestic insurance
industries.62 They initially regulated insurers to guarantee the
solvency of these companies.63 These initial regulations compelled insurance companies to demonstrate their financial ability to pay out insurance claims to policyholders64 and to show
the long-term sustainability of their plans to cover insured
risks.65 Over time, states developed a complex system of regulations that controlled additional aspects of the sale of insur-

58 See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
539 (1995).
59 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985).
60 See Scherk v. Alerbto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974).
61 Id.
62 Ann Hilton Fisher, Small Employers and the Health Insurance Needs
of Employees with High Health Care Costs: A Need for Better Models, 8 EMP.
RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 53, 63 (2004).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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ance such as rate setting,66 licensing of insurance brokers,67
commercial advertising,68 and impermissible discrimination.69
The evolving intricacy of state regulation of insurance resulted from insurance’s status as not “commerce” regulable by
Congress—even when out-of-state providers sold insurance policies to citizens of another state.70 In its 1869 decision, Paul v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States held that insurance was not interstate commerce.71 In Paul, Samuel Paul,
an agent of several New York insurance companies, was convicted in Virginia of selling fire insurance without a license.72
The Court affirmed Paul’s conviction on appeal,73 rejecting his
argument that the application of Virginia’s licensing requirement to an out-of-state insurance company substantially interfered with interstate commerce.74 It reasoned that the sale of
an insurance policy is a local contractual transaction governed
by state law rather than a transaction involving articles or subjects of interstate trade or commerce.75
Seventy-five years later, the Court overruled Paul in

66 See generally Charles W. Havens III & Rita M. Theisen, The Application of United States and EEC Antitrust Laws to Reinsurance and Insurance
Pooling Agreements, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1299 (1985) (discussing a particular
state regulation of rate setting in the context of McCarran-Ferguson).
67 See Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 282 (2000) (“The core elements of early state insurance regulation were the licensing of the insurance
companies, insurance agents and brokers . . . .”).
68 See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560
(1958).
69 William Goddard, Swimming in the Wake of Dehoyos: When Federal
Courts Sail into Disparate Impact Waters, Will State Regulation of Insurance
Remain Above the Waves?, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 369, 371 (2004).
70 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177, 183-85 (1868), overruled in part
by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as recognized in Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); see also U.S. Dept. of
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499 (1993) (explaining that prior to SouthEastern, the states’ domain over insurance regulation was “virtually exclusive”).
71 Paul, 75 U.S. at 183.
72 Gene Matthew Eckel, The New Standard Applicable to State Taxation
of a Nonresident — An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal,
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1311, 1319 (1999).
73 Id.
74 See Paul, 75 U.S. at 182–83.
75 Id. at 183.
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South-Eastern Underwriters Association v. United States, holding for the first time that Congress had the power to regulate
insurance pursuant to the Commerce Clause.76 In SouthEastern, South-Eastern Underwriters Association (“SEUA”)
was indicted for conspiring with other insurance companies to
restrain interstate trade in violation of the Sherman Act.77
SEUA relied on Paul to challenge the application of the Sherman Act to the sale of insurance as an unconstitutional exercise of federal power.78 The Court rejected SEUA’s contention,79 relying on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence that had
broadened the understanding of “commerce” following the New
Deal.80
The potential implications of South-Eastern provoked
concern among the states about the constitutional validity of
their entire insurance regulation schemes.81 The decision effectively applied all federal commerce legislation to insurance
companies and thereby jeopardized any conflicting state insurance regulation.82 Moreover, states were concerned that even if
future legislation adopted by Congress was not intended to apply specifically to insurance industries, the legislation would
preempt conflicting state regulation.83 They also feared that
any state regulation that substantially burdened the interstate
sale of insurance was constitutionally suspect under the

76 United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944),
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, ch. 20, 59
Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006)), as
recognized in Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
77 See S.-E Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. at 534.
78 See id. at 545.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 545–53.
81 Id.
82 See Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996).
83 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1993) (explaining that states feared the threat that South-Eastern posed to their virtually exclusive regulation of insurance and that Congress responded by
providing that federal legislation would not, by mere implication, preempt
state law).
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Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.84
To quell states’ concerns,85 Congress swiftly passed a bill
that limited South-Eastern’s effect on state law.86 The bill, introduced by Senators Patrick McCarran and Homer Ferguson,87 sparked debate that centered on the South-Eastern decision.88 The legislation, known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
expressly declared Congress’s position “that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
States.”89 To achieve this goal, section 2(b) further provided
that state laws enacted to regulate the business of insurance
reverse preempt federal laws that did not specifically relate to
the business of insurance.90 Section 2(b), however, expressly
excluded the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the Merchant Marine Act from federal laws
that may be reverse preempted.91
The language of section 2(b) demonstrates that McCarranFerguson is primarily a rule of construction that federal and
state courts must follow.92 If a party shows the three constitutive elements of section 2(b), then that federal law “shall not be

84 Cf. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808–10 (2008)
(articulating that courts applying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
will not uphold state laws that unduly burden interstate commerce); FosterFountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) (applying the dormant
Commerce Clause principle prior to South-Eastern).
85 See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1960).
86 See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500 (explaining how “Congress moved quickly to
restore the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation . . .
[by] enact[ing] the McCarran-Ferguson Act within a year of the decision in
South-Eastern Underwriters.”).
87 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 547 n.20
(1978).
88 See 91 CONG. REC. 1,478 (1945) (quoting Senator Claude Pepper as introducing the bill as a response to the South-Eastern decision and arguing
that the adoption of the bill would “emasculat[e] the . . . decision . . . .”).
89 McCarran Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 1011 (2009)).
90 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
91 Id. § 1014.
92 Id. § 1012(b) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of any state.”) (emphasis added).
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construed” to preempt state law.93 First, the federal law must
not specifically relate to the “business of insurance.”94 Second,
the state law must have been “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”95 And third, the federal law
must be an “Act of Congress.”96 Upon establishing these three
elements, McCarran-Ferguson directs courts to reject a party’s
preemption defense.97 If one or more of the three elements is
not established, then the ordinary rules of preemption apply.98
Quite simply, a federal law “specifically relates to the
business of insurance” when the word “insurance” appears in
the text of the law.99 The Supreme Court explained in Barnett
Bank, N.A. v. Nelson that the ordinary rules of preemption applied to a federal bank statute because it referred to “insurance,” thus failing to meet section 2(b)’s requirement that the
federal law not specifically relate to insurance.100 The Court
emphasized the federal bank statute’s explicit use of the word
“insurance” when it permitted national banks to “act as the
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company,” and to “solicit[] and sell[] insurance.”101 But determining whether a state
law was “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance” is a factor-based inquiry.102 The three relevant factors are whether the activity regulated by state law (1) transfers or spreads the insured risk; (2) is integral to the insurer–
policyholder relationship; and (3) is specific to the insurance
industry.103 Although none of these factors is dispositive, the
more that are present, 104 the more likely a court is to hold that
93

Id.

94 Id.
95

Id.

96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Barnett

Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1996).
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2009).
100 Nelson, 517 U.S. at 38–41.
101 Id. at 39 (citation and internal quotes omitted).
102 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
103 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (citing
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)).
104 See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
99
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this second element of Section 2(b) has been met.105
C. Reverse Preemption of Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act
Despite the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration
Act’s substantive guarantee regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements, several states have relied upon McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption rule to continue
regulating and even prohibit arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.106 Consequently, states have not hesitated to
continue regulating private parties’ decisions to arbitrate insurance disputes.107
In response to the increasing prevalence of arbitration
agreements in insurance contracts,108 states enacted regulations that included outright bans on the agreements;109 requirements on the wording, size, or location of the text of arbitration provisions in a contract;110 and mandatory approval of

105 See id. (explaining that these three factors aid a court’s determination
of whether a state law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance). Another aspect that may be relevant to this inquiry is whether
the “state law” at hand is a state statute, administrative regulation, or common law rule. See generally Randall, supra note 7 (arguing that courts’ decisional rules might not be state laws protected by McCarran–Ferguson because they were not “enacted”).
106 See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 494 (5th
Cir. 2006); Davister Corp. v. United Republic Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277,
1279–81 (10th Cir. 1998); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 384 (Colo. 2003). After South-Eastern, the Federal Arbitration Act applied to insurance contracts
by virtue of their status as “commerce.” Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing for
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts “evidencing a transaction
involving commerce”); United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 553 (1944) (holding that insurance contracts are part of interstate commerce). Thus, the reverse preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act by state
laws regulating domestic insurance contracts follows from both McCarran–
Ferguson’s historical context and legislative history.
107 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b)(1)–(2) (2009); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403 (2009); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (2008); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 417.050 (LexisNexis 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2009); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 7417 (Consol. 2011).
108 Randall, supra note 7, at 253.
109 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (2010) (excepting “[a]ny contract of insurance” from its general provision that arbitration agreements shall be enforced).
110 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2008) (providing
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the agreements by state officials.111 These state laws generally
aim to protect consumers and policyholders in insurance
agreements, as evidenced by the mandates of these laws.112
For example, California and Louisiana regulate arbitration
clauses in contracts for health insurance for the purported purpose of protecting consumers by highlighting the presence and
scope of arbitration agreements.113
Courts addressing whether McCarran-Ferguson permits
these state laws to reverse preempt the Federal Arbitration
Act’s general guarantee of the enforceability of domestic arbitration agreements have answered the question in the affirmative.114 For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth
and Tenth Circuit as well as the Supreme Court of Colorado
have all addressed the issue of whether McCarran-Ferguson
applies to the Federal Arbitration Act.115 All have held that
state laws regulating the business of insurance reverse
preempt Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration pursuant to
McCarran-Ferguson.116
III. WHETHER MCCARRAN-FERGUSON PERMITS STATE LAW TO
REVERSE PREEMPT THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
In cases in which parties have relied upon the substantive guarantees of the New York Convention to uphold the validity of an arbitration agreement, courts have split on whether

that any contract clause restricting the right to a jury trial in health care insurance plans must be “prominently displayed” in a “separate article” immediately before the signature line on an enrollment form).
111 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 631.20, 631.85 (2009) (requiring arbitration
clauses to be approved by the state insurance commissioner).
112 Johnson, supra note 13, at 582–83.
113 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. § 22:868
(2009).
114 See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2006); Davister Corp. v. United Republic Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998);
Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003).
115 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.
116 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.
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McCarran-Ferguson permits state law to reverse preempt the
New York Convention, as implemented through Chapter 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act.117 Both the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Second and Fifth Circuits have addressed this issue and
reached contrary conclusions after considering whether the
New York Convention is a self-executing or a non-selfexecuting treaty.118
Self-execution stands for the principle that a treaty has an
independent force of law in U.S. courts and does not need to be
implemented by domestic legislation.119 In resolving the reverse preemption question, the self-execution framework begins by asking whether the New York Convention is a selfexecuting treaty that has the force of law in U.S. courts.120 If
so, then the Convention operates independently of Chapter 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act.121 As such, the Convention would
not rely on an “Act of Congress” and McCarran-Ferguson would
not apply to the Convention. If it is a non-self-executing treaty,
then the Convention has no preemptive effect of federal law122
unless it relies on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act,
which made the Convention applicable in U.S. courts (i.e., executed the Convention).123 The implication of this conclusion is
that the Convention would necessarily rely on Chapter 2,
which would presumably be an “Act of Congress” that “shall
[not] be construed” to preempt a State law as per McCarranFerguson.
The Second Circuit, in Stephens v. American International Insurance Company, held that McCarran-Ferguson permits
state law to reverse preempt the New York Convention as im-

Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.
118 Am. Bankers Ins. Co. 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.
119 See generally Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled in part
by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
120 Cf. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that“[t]his argument fails because the Convention is not selfexecuting, and therefore, relies upon an Act of Congress for its implementation”).
121 Id.
122 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–17.
123 See generally 9 U.S.C. § 1 (titled Enforcement of the Convention).
117
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plemented through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.124
The Stephens court concluded that a Kentucky law reverse
preempted the New York Convention because the Convention
was a non-self-executing treaty that required domestic legislation to have effect in U.S. courts.125 In Stephens, a Kentucky
reinsurance company sold insurance policies to several insurance companies, two of which were based in Britain.126 After a
Kentucky court found the Kentucky reinsurance company to be
insolvent, the court appointed the Commissioner of Insurance
to oversee the company’s liquidation.127 The Commissioner
sought to recover insurance premiums from the two British
companies, one of which moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.128 The Commissioner argued that Kentucky law
prohibited arbitration agreements and that McCarranFerguson saved this prohibition from preemption.129
The Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner of Insurance, holding that “the Convention is not self-executing, and
therefore, relies upon an Act of Congress for its implementation.”130 As the sole basis for its reasoning, the court quoted
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson:
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself,
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms
of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties
engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to
the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
court.131

Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the Commissioner
124 See

Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.

125 Id.
126 Id.

at 42.

127 Id.

See id. at 42–43.
See id. at 43–44.
130 Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.
131 Id. at 45 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313-14 (1829)).
128
129
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could not be compelled to arbitrate.132
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit, in Safety National Casualty
Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,133 held
that McCarran-Ferguson did not permit state law to reverse
preempt the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.134 In Safety National, a Louisiana insurance fund assigned its rights under an insurance contract with
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London to Safety National
Casualty Insurance Corporation.135 Despite Louisiana law
prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, the
Louisiana insurance fund’s insurance agreement contained an
arbitration clause.136 Safety National sued Underwriters in
federal court and Underwriters moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration agreement.137 Underwriters argued
that McCarran-Ferguson permitted Louisiana’s law to reverse
preempt the New York Convention because Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, which implemented the treaty, was an
“Act of Congress.”138
Although the majority in Safety National concluded that
the self-executing nature of the Convention was “unclear,”139
the concurring and dissenting opinions diverged based on a
disagreement about the self-execution status of the New York
Convention.140 Judge Owen, writing for the majority, gave a
four-fold rationale for the court’s conclusion that the New York
Convention preempted the Louisiana law even if it is a nonself-executing treaty.141 The court’s first rationale was that be-

132 See

id at 46.
Cf. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
134 See id. at 732; see also Kevin D. Oles, Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2010), 25 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1095, 1107-08 (2010) (recognizing the conflict between
Safety National and Stephens).
135 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 746 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 746–47.
137 See id. at 746.
138 Id. at 748–49.
139 Id. at 721–22 (en banc).
140 See id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring) (“[T]he plain text of Article II
of the Convention compels a finding of self-execution.”); id. at 737 (Elrod, J.,
dissenting).
141 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 717-732.
133
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cause Chapter 2 of the New York Convention did not modify or
conflict with the New York Convention, Chapter 2 did not “replace or displace” the Convention as the operative source of law
in U.S. courts.142 The Convention was still a treaty that operated as “an international agreement or contract negotiated by
the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not Congress.”143
The majority’s second rationale was that it would make little sense for Congress to have intended the words “Act of Congress” in McCarran-Ferguson not to apply to self-executing
treaties, but to apply to non-self-executing treaties that had
been implemented through federal legislation.144 Its third rationale was that the text of section 203 of Chapter 2 provides
that “an action or proceeding falling under the Convention
shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the
United States.”145 The court explained that this language
demonstrated Congress’s intent for the Convention to operate
independent of implementing legislation.146 The court’s fourth
justification was that because McCarran-Ferguson forbids judicial “construction” of a federal law to preempt certain state
laws, a court would necessarily need to “construe” the provisions of the New York Convention rather than Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.147
Judge Clement’s concurrence concluded that the New
York Convention preempted the Louisiana law because the
Convention was self-executing.148 Under the Supreme Court’s
test in Medellín v. Texas, a provision of a treaty is selfexecuting if the provision is directed to the courts of the United
States and if the provision uses mandatory language—such as
“shall” or “must”—in directing U.S. courts to take a certain ac-

Id. at 722–23.
Id.
144 Id. at 723.
145 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)).
146 Id. at 724.
147 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724.
148 Id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring).
142
143
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tion.149 Because the third paragraph of Article II of the Convention provides that “the Court” of Contracting States “shall”
refer the parties to arbitration, Judge Clement would have held
the provision to be self-executing.150 Judge Clement would
have upheld the arbitration provision because the selfexecuting nature of the treaty permitted the treaty to operate
independent of any Act of Congress, which would be subject to
reverse preemption under McCarran-Ferguson.151
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Elrod argued that
McCarran-Ferguson saved the Louisiana law from preemption
because the Convention was a non-self-executing treaty and
therefore relied on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act to
have the force and effect of law in U.S. courts.152 With regard
to the issue of whether the New York Convention was an “Act
of Congress” under McCarran–Ferguson, Judge Elrod first criticized the court’s “failure to ask the right question at the outset.”153 After referring to the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephens, she justified her conclusion that the treaty was non-selfexecuting because the treaty had been implemented through
domestic legislation.154 Judge Elrod criticized the majority’s
failure to provide any support for its proposition that a nonself-executing treaty could have any preemptive effect with regard to state law.155 She also rebutted the majority’s analysis
that a court construing the substantive guarantees of the Convention must refer to and construe the textual provisions of the
Convention itself.156 She argued that this contradicted the
principle that, once implemented, non-self-executing treaties
only have the force of law via the implementing legislation.157
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE SELF-EXECUTION FRAMEWORK
The self-execution doctrine fails to adequately answer the

149 See

id.
See id. at 734.
151 Id. 732-737.
152 Id. at 735 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
153 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 735 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 742–43.
155 Id. at 740.
156 Id. at 741–42.
157 See id.
150
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question of whether McCarran-Ferguson permits a state to reverse preempt the New York Convention because it ignores accepted methods of statutory interpretation, is irrelevant outside the context of establishing the existence of a legal right
under a treaty, and fails to answer the particular legal question
posed by the clash between McCarran-Ferguson and the New
York Convention.
Because the majority, concurrence, and dissent in Safety
National as well as the Second Circuit in Stephens approached
the issue assuming some relevance of the self-execution question, none reached a conclusion in a satisfactory manner. Contrary to Judge Elrod’s allegation that the Safety National majority asked the wrong question as to whether the Convention,
as domestically implemented, was an “Act of Congress,”158 this
question was precisely the correct one. Asking whether the
Convention is or is not self-executing, as did Judge Elrod’s dissent and Judge Clement’s concurrence, is the wrong question
because it fails to consider adequately the purposes animating
McCarran-Ferguson. It presupposes that Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act is an Act of Congress under McCarranFerguson and that the New York Convention is not. The right
question—and the best way to understand the issue—is: what
was Congress’s purpose in enacting McCarran-Ferguson?
Although the Safety National majority was the closest to
the mark by giving some credence to the purposes motivating
McCarran-Ferguson, it merely paid lip service to Congressional
intent. It pointed out that Judge Elrod’s position would require
the application of McCarran-Ferguson to a self-executing treaty, but not to non-self-executing treaties that are domestically
implemented, which Congress was “unlikely” to have intended.159 The majority reasoned that if this was Congress’s intent,
then it would have added the words “or any treaty requiring
congressional implementation” after the words “Act of Congress.”160 The majority had thereby reframed the question as

Id. at 738.
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724.
160 Id.
158
159
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follows: if the United States signed a treaty recognizing individuals’ private agreements to arbitrate disputes, how or why
would Congress’s subsequent passage of McCarran-Ferguson
reflect Congress’s intent that any future domestic codification
of that guarantee in the Federal Arbitration Act give to the
states the right to decide whether that guarantee was applicable in the business of insurance?161
But perhaps the passage of an Act of Congress to implement a treaty was irrelevant to the drafters of McCarranFerguson. So long as courts do not find an Act of Congress to
preempt a state law specific to insurance, McCarran-Ferguson
is satisfied. By enacting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress recognized that continued regulation of insurance by the several
states was in the public interest.162 It intended that no future
Congressional action would, by mere implication, interfere with
the states’ ability to regulate insurance.163 Congressional
commerce legislation—with either purely domestic or both domestic and international implications—has the potential to interfere with the state regulation of insurance. Hence, a Congressional action that guarantees the domestic enforceability of
a treaty and that may interfere with the state regulation of insurance poses the same risk that Congress sought to address in
passing McCarran-Ferguson. As such, Congress arguably intended McCarran-Ferguson to apply to any federal law—treaty
or statute—that potentially implicated the business of insurance.
Additionally, the self-execution doctrine has relevance only
in determining whether a party is asserting a domestically enforceable right under a treaty. The self-execution doctrine had
little, if anything, to do with reverse preemption under McCarran-Ferguson until the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephens.
Prior to Stephens, the self-execution doctrine had been used only to answer the particular legal question of whether a treaty
confers upon an individual a right that is domestically enforceable in U.S. courts.164 Thus, the Stephens court perhaps accepted a faulty premise: that the self-execution doctrine is rele-

Id. at 720.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006).
163 See id. § 1012(a).
164 Safety Nat’l Cas Corp., 587 F.3d at 730.
161
162
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vant once Congress has enacted legislation implementing a
treaty.
The Supreme Court of the United States first developed
the self-execution doctrine in its 1829 decision of Foster v.
Neilson.165 In Foster, the plaintiff asserted rights over land in
Louisiana pursuant to a land grant that was recognized by a
treaty between the United States and Spain.166 The Court sided with the defendant, holding that the treaty between the
United States and Spain was not self-executing.167 It reasoned
that although a treaty is equivalent to a legislative act under
the Supremacy Clause, it has no domestic legal effect unless
Congress “[ha]s carried [it] into execution.”168 The test for
whether a treaty is self-executing, Foster counsels, is whether
the terms of a treaty are contractual (i.e., general obligations of
the parties to the treaty) rather than legal (i.e., obligations that
are directed to the judicial branches of the parties to the treaty).169 Given the context in which the Court first developed the
concept of self-executing treaties, courts in the United States
have continued to use the doctrine only when the parties dispute whether a treaty confers a right that is legally enforceable
in U.S. courts.170 Foster implicitly instructs that where a party
asserts a right under a treaty, the question is first whether the
obligation is one the United States has undertaken by ratifying

165 See
166 See

generally Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
id.

167 Id.
168 See

id. at 314.
id.
170 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (explaining the
self-execution doctrine as intended to answer the question of whether an international treaty creates binding domestic law absent of domestic implantation); see, e.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This multilateral treaty is non-self-executing and thus does not itself create any rights
enforceable in U.S. courts.”). However, determining that a treaty is selfexecuting is not dispositive of whether the law actually confers a domestically
enforceable right. See Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d
605, 615 (3d Cir. 2008) (“By itself, the status of ‘self-executing’ does not answer the question of whether a document creates a private right of enforcement.”).
169 See
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or acceding to the treaty.171 The Court implied that execution
could occur in one of two ways: either the treaty has been carried into effect through domestic legislation or the treaty is carried into execution by its own terms.172 Where the United
States has passed domestic legislation to give the treaty legal
effect in U.S. courts, then the party asserting the right under
the treaty has a legally enforceable right in U.S. courts.173 In
such circumstances, it is unlikely that a party would argue that
another party had no domestically enforceable legal rights under the treaty, as it has already been implemented through
domestic legislation.
Only where Congress has not passed legislation carrying
the treaty into execution is the self-execution, non-selfexecution dichotomy relevant.174 If the terms of a treaty reflect
that the parties have bound their courts to follow the terms of
the treaty, then the treaty is self-executing175 and a party may
assert a right under the treaty regardless of the absence of domestic legislation.176 Alternatively phrased, if a treaty is selfexecuting, then the legal conclusion a court must reach is that
the treaty confers on a party a domestically enforceable right
despite the absence of domestic legislation conferring the right
pursuant to the treaty.
Given the context in which the self-execution doctrine
arose—and the way in which the doctrine has been applied by
courts in the United States since Foster—reliance on the doctrine to address whether McCarran-Ferguson permits state law
to reverse preempt the New York Convention is misplaced.
The Court developed the self-execution doctrine as a way to answer the question of whether a treaty confers upon a party a
right that is enforceable in U.S. courts.177 Because Congress
has passed legislation to carry the New York Convention into
execution,178 the question of whether a party has a right enforceable in U.S. courts has already been asked and answered.
171 See

generally Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See generally Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
178 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2006).
172 See
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Because Congress has already carried the New York Convention into execution,179 raising the issue of self-execution in the
McCarran-Ferguson context is erroneous. Ignoring the question of whether a treaty confers upon a party a domestically enforceable right, the Fifth and Second Circuits have used the
doctrine of self-execution to ask how a party is asserting the
domestically enforceable right under the New York Convention.
The mootness of this question is underscored by Foster’s explanation that the self-execution question only becomes relevant
in the absence of domestic legislation.180 Following Foster’s logic, a self-execution analysis of a treaty that has been domestically implemented is irrelevant.181
Rather, opinions from the Fifth and Second Circuits have
taken the self-execution doctrine out of its element. According
to Foster, if a treaty operates “without the aid of any legislative
provision,” then it is self-executing.182 To hold that McCarranFerguson does or does not apply to the New York Convention
because the latter is or is not self-executing requires a fallacious understanding of Foster by flipping the precedent and antecedent as follows: if a treaty is self-executing, then it operates
“without the aid of any legislative provision.”183 By the reasoning of the Fifth and Second Circuit opinions, only if the New
York Convention operates without the aid of domestic legislation—Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act—does McCarran-Ferguson not apply to the New York Convention.184 This
reasoning is circular because it requires ascertaining whether
the Convention operates “without the aid of any legislative
provision” to determine whether the Convention is selfexecuting for the purpose of concluding that the Convention

179 Id.

§ 201.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 253.
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 254.
184 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
180
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operates “without the aid of any legislative provision.”185 It is
further flawed because, under the self-execution doctrine as it
originated in Foster, ascertaining whether a treaty operates
“without the aid of any legislative provision” requires a determination of whether the treaty is self-executing for the purpose
of concluding that a party may assert rights conferred by the
treaty in U.S. courts.186
And regardless of a court’s outcome in the self-execution
analysis, a party asserting rights under the New York Convention necessarily relies on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act. The Safety National majority reasoned that regardless of
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing, legislation that implements a treaty does not replace or displace the
implemented treaty.187 As such, the Safety National majority’s
reasoning would proceed as follows: even if a treaty operates
through domestic legislation, the treaty is still a treaty and not
an Act of Congress subject to McCarran-Ferguson.188 Although
it is not arguable that subsequently enacted legislation dissipates the legal agreement that the President makes with other
nations, in order to assert the rights guaranteed by the New
York Convention, a party must rely on either of the first two
chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act. Consider the following
hypothetical situations:
A, Inc., a British reinsurance company, and B, Co., a Louisiana insurance company, agree to arbitrate disputes arising
out of an international reinsurance agreement despite Louisiana’s prohibition on arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.
If A sued B in federal court to collect its past due premiums from B, B could move to compel arbitration. B could rely
on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which gives the
federal court the authority to compel arbitration “in accordance
with the agreement at any place therein provided.”189 In permitting the court to compel arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration agreement, section 206 of Chapter 2 would conflict

Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 732.
See Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. 253, 253 (1829).
187 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 722-23.
188 See id.
189 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
185
186
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with and arguably preempt Louisiana’s prohibition against arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. Given the potential for such a conflict, McCarran-Ferguson would require that
this provision of an Act of Congress not be construed to
preempt Louisiana law. Such a construction of section 206
would require the exercising of a federal court’s power to grant
a motion to compel arbitration in that case. Alternatively, B
could rely on section 4 of Chapter 1, which permits courts to
compel arbitration. This would still be a provision in an Act of
Congress, however, to which McCarran-Ferguson would also
apply.
If B sued A in federal court for failure to pay claims under
the reinsurance contract, A similarly could move to compel arbitration under either section 206 of Chapter 2 or section 4 of
Chapter 1. However, this would require construing a provision
of an Act of Congress to preempt Louisiana law in direct contravention of McCarran-Ferguson, as would the previously presented hypothetical.
Congress required a party relying on the New York Convention to also rely on an Act of Congress. Without reliance on
either of the first two chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act, a
federal court presumably would lack the power to compel parties to arbitrate their disputes. And section 201 of Chapter 2
provides that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in
United States courts in accordance with this Chapter.”190
Thus, the self-execution question provides little help in understanding why McCarran-Ferguson would not reverse preempt
the New York Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals’s method
of resolving whether McCarran-Ferguson permits a state law
to reverse preempt the New York Convention has turned on
whether the Convention is self-executing or non-self-

190 Id.
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executing.191 This approach fails to take into account commonly accepted method of statutory interpretation, as it almost
completely disregards Congress’s purpose in passing McCarran-Ferguson. Moreover, it takes the self-execution doctrine
out of a context to resolve a legal issue to which the doctrine
was not intended to apply. Regardless of whether the Convention is or is not self-executing, a party asserting its rights to
have a federal court recognize and enforce its international arbitration agreement under the Convention must necessarily rely on an Act of Congress. A party making such a claim must
rely on the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides a federal
court with the express authority to compel arbitration. The
Federal Arbitration Act is an Act of Congress under McCarranFerguson, and McCarran-Ferguson therefore compels a reading
of the Federal Arbitration Act that federal courts have no authority to compel arbitration where doing so would effectively
preempt a state insurance law. Because the self-execution
framework fails to answer the interpretive problem posed by
McCarran-Ferguson, courts should consider alternatives approaches that rely more substantially on congressional intent.

See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); Safety
Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d. at 722-23.
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